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“Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of
men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they
confuse with absolute truth.” —Simone de Beauvoir1

For the past forty years, feminism has provided an important
paradigm through which to critique modernity. A feminist analytical
lens allows us to view social action and policy making differently and
to uncover underlying assumptions about social action. However, in
part because of the backlash Susan Faludi wrote so eloquently about
in the early 1990s, the “F” word is not used much outside academic
circles.2 For many, feminism evokes the image of a bra-burning, man∗

Debora Halbert is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Otterbein College
located just outside Columbus, Ohio. She has written articles on intellectual property
issues, and is the author of Intellectual Property in the Information Age: The Politics
of Expanding Property Rights (Quorum 1999). She has recently completed her
second book, Resisting Intellectual Property (Routledge 2005).
1. SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
REVOLUTION 176 (1970) (quoting the famous French feminist’s assertion that society
itself is male).
2. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN, at xix-xxiii (1991) (concluding that the latest backlash against feminism is
part of a pattern of backlashes throughout American history triggered by a
perception of great advancement of women’s rights). The use of the term the “‘F’
word” is widely disseminated in feminist literature and is used to describe the way the
backlash against feminism has made it into a dirty word. Id.; see The Infamous FWord, http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~elk/feminismquotes.html (last visited July 26,
2006) (linking “the F-word” to common quotes about feminism); see also Amy
Richards & Julie Parker, The F-Word, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (1995), http://www
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hating radical. For many more, to the degree a feminist movement
was ever necessary, there is no need for it anymore. Anyone who has
studied feminist thought understands that not only is the stereotypical
image of a feminist inaccurate, but there are continued benefits from
a feminist analysis of issues. Furthermore, there is no single feminism
that can claim to speak for all women who call themselves feminists.
Feminist thought aligns loosely around themes regarding women’s
equality,3 but the multiplicity of feminism(s) at times overshadows the
similarities.4
In part because significant differences exist between the many
varieties of feminism, feminist thought has blossomed into a complex
tapestry of perspectives.5 Offering a feminist interpretation can
disrupt conventional understandings with questions about male
domination and the uncertainty of truth. Creating a feminist
epistemology, a feminist critique, a feminist standpoint, or simply
legitimating “women’s ways of knowing”6 provides insight into power,
social structures, and theory that would otherwise be missing. In
other words, while there are many feminist avenues for critique,
applying a feminist framework gives us a different way of looking at
the world.7
.newint.org/issue270/fword.htm (discussing the issues surrounding young people
and the term feminism).
3. See JUDITH GRANT, FUNDAMENTAL FEMINISM: CONTESTING THE CORE CONCEPTS
OF FEMINIST THEORY 42-43 (1993) (arguing that while it may be possible and necessary
to identify core feminist concepts, contemporary feminism is diverse and
contradictory).
4. See Sandra Harding, Conclusion: Epistemological Questions, in MODERN
FEMINISMS: POLITICAL, LITERARY, CULTURAL 319, 319-21 (Maggie Humm ed., Columbia
Univ. Press 1992) (1987) [hereinafter MODERN FEMINISMS] (suggesting that a unitary
feminist theory is unlikely given the importance of women’s unique experiences
based on race, class, and culture in the development of their perspectives).
5. Just to name a few different types of feminist thought, there are Marxist
feminists, radical feminists, postmodern feminists, standpoint feminists, eco-feminists
and first, second, and third wave feminists. At times, animosity exists between these
branches. See, e.g., JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG
WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 219-21 (2000) (arguing that tensions arise because
second wave feminists do not have enough respect for younger women in the
movement). See generally THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN
OF COLOR, at xxiii-xxv (Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa eds., 2d ed. 1983)
(explaining the different kinds of exploitation women of color experience in an
anthology of essays and poetry).
6. GRANT, supra note 3, at 94 (describing the concept of a women’s way of
knowing as derived from feminist standpoint theory). This theory suggests that there
is a distinctly “female” type of knowledge—a feminist epistemology. Id. Grant points
out that a distinction must be made between a women’s way of knowing and the
development of a feminist lens. Id.
7. See SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 136 (1986)
(suggesting that feminist science or epistemology could exist as an “alternative mode
of knowledge-seeking” that would defy the dichotomy that currently exists in society
between males and females).
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My interest in intellectual property and feminist theory led me to
investigate what might become visible if a feminist lens was applied to
copyright and patent law.8 The goal of this paper is merely to probe
several dimensions of feminist interpretation(s), not to be
comprehensive, due to the complexity of both feminist literature and
of intellectual property. Given that there are multiple feminisms, I
seek to map some of the possible contributions feminists can make to
an understanding of intellectual property.9 This paper is divided into
areas where the connections between feminist theorizing and
intellectual property seem most salient. Part I investigates feminist
epistemology and the construction of knowledge. Part II highlights
the links between feminism, texts, and publication by looking at the
gendered construction of authorship, as well as the way feminists,
especially postmodern feminists, theorize about texts, and the possible
alternatives offered by independent feminist presses.
My early hypothesis was that feminist theory could be used to create
a critique of expanding intellectual property rights. However, I am
not convinced all feminist theory, and by extension all feminists,
would be equally critical of intellectual property. That being said, my
argument is that while some feminists may perceive benefits from
copyright and/or patent law, feminist theory can make visible the
underlying masculine assumptions existing in our construction of
intellectual property as well as highlight a political economy of
intellectual property that has historically benefited men more than
women. Furthermore, the value of a feminist analysis is that it can be
8. The term intellectual property is much more recent than the underlying
regimes of copyright and patent law. See CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 18-19 (2005) (explaining that
intellectual property as a concept was in use in the mid-nineteenth century, but not in
common use until the twentieth century). While the term is used to refer to
copyright, patents, trademarks, and other generic regimes, it rests upon the
assumption that intangible products are similar to tangible products and can thus be
called ‘property.’ Id. at 18-19. The term is not without its critics. See, e.g., Richard
M. Stallman, Confusing Words and Phrases that are Worth Avoiding, in FREE
SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN (Joshua Gray, ed.
2002), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#Intellectual
Property (arguing that one should avoid thinking in terms of intellectual property
because it conceals as much as it reveals about the underlying agreements).
9. A feminist analysis of intellectual property is currently underway. In April of
2004, Professors Anne Shalleck and Peter Jaszi of American University’s Washington
College of Law brought an interdisciplinary group of scholars together to discuss the
issues of gender and intellectual property. The conference, “Mapping Gender and
IP,” approached the subject from numerous angles—the role of women in fields of
intellectual property law, the way judges interpret the law in a gendered manner,
literary criticism, and many others. See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Poaching and
Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111, 111-20 (Lise
Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (stressing the importance of a feminist
framework to the future of authorship and the development of intellectual property
law).
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used politically—to think actively about what the future may hold by
avoiding choices that privilege men more than women.
I. FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
In this section, I seek to map the ways feminist theorists have
approached cultural production and developed a feminist
epistemology.
Intellectual property scholarship and feminist
epistemologies have proceeded upon parallel but unconnected tracks.
Feminist scholars rarely, if ever, mention the words copyright, patent,
or intellectual property; intellectual property scholars rarely, if ever,
appeal to feminist interpretations to better understand the law.10
However, while the words copyright and patent do not appear in the
feminist literature, the ideas underlying these legal regimes are
evident when feminists talk about the production of culture as male
dominated, about how women have been excluded from creative
work or have had their work appropriated by men, and about a
feminist epistemology.11 Thus, by investigating the ways feminists
theorize about the construction of knowledge, new insights into how
intellectual property law has been developed upon gendered
assumptions may become apparent. These feminist theorists are
typically not read with the idea of intellectual property in mind, but
the connections between the two are clear. While feminist theorists
will be familiar with these thinkers, intellectual property scholars may
not be, and I have chosen to outline the feminist arguments at length
to make the links between both types of scholarship clear.
Many feminist theorists discussed in this section, especially those
seeking a unique women’s way of knowing, have been accused by later
feminists of essentializing women by conferring on them a “unique”
set of characteristics. While I am sensitive to this critique, in this
section I try to navigate between essentialism and what can be
politically valuable about theories focused on a women’s way of
knowing.
While I do not wish to reduce any individual to
essentialized claims about his or her “nature,” it is possible to use this
stream of feminist theory to develop an argument about another
world where both men and women can participate in a different type
of cultural production and ownership—a world generated from a
10. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 776
(2004) (encouraging legal scholars to take an interest in the way feminism may help
interpret the law and demonstrating the ways a feminist analysis can be applied to an
understanding of trademark decisions).
11. See id.; see also Simone Murray, Deeds and Words: The Woman's Press and
the Politics of Print, in 11 WOMEN: A CULTURAL REV. 197, 197-98 (2000) (discussing
the male-dominated field of publishing and the need for increased female literary
participation).
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feminist standpoint. By using these feminist theorists to make an
argument about the future, instead of focusing on traits that are
uniquely feminine, it becomes possible to move beyond essentialism
and shed light onto the social construction of knowledge protected by
intellectual property laws.
A. Early Feminist Theory and the Social Construction of Knowledge
An important early contribution to understanding how feminists
might interpret intellectual property can be found in the work of
Shulamith Firestone. Firestone published The Dialectic of Sex in
1970, and her work is among the most important second wave
contributions to feminist theory.12 While the terms copyright, patent,
and intellectual property do not appear within the context of
Firestone’s argument, she spends considerable time investigating the
relationship between women, culture, and the construction of
knowledge.13 Firestone’s argument is premised upon a dialectical
relationship between men and women that influences all aspects of
our lives from personal relationships to culture and science.14 Within
this dialectic, she argues that contemporary society considers the
feminine inferior to the masculine.15 Sex dualism precludes women
from participating in “culture,” which is masculine space.16
Culture is a masculine construction for second wave feminists.17
According to Firestone, the role women play, from a masculine
perspective, is at best indirect.18 Women “contribute” to culture by
acting as the “raw fuel for the culture machine” by providing
emotional support or inspiration for the cultural creation of men.19
12. FIRESTONE, supra note 1; see also MODERN FEMINISMS, supra note 4, at 53-54
(describing second wave feminism as concerned with reproductive rights of women,
but aligning with first wave feminists to also unpack the concept of “woman”).
13. See id. at 176-91 (theorizing that a woman’s relation to culture is through
men and, therefore, indirect and removed).
14. Id. at 172-73 (depicting graphically the scope of human history as seen
through a gendered lens).
15. See id. at 178 (arguing that “[b]ecause cultural dicta are set by men,
presenting only the male view . . . women are kept from achieving an authentic
picture of their reality”).
16. Id.
17. The argument regarding the masculine construction of knowledge and
history is reflected in the scholarship of contemporary feminists interested in
understanding the underlying power structures associated with the evolution of
Western thought more generally. See, e.g., CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF
NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 152 (1980) (developing
the argument that western history is premised upon the narrative of male supremacy
over women and nature).
18. FIRESTONE, supra note 1, at 176 (arguing that women’s participation in
culture has primarily been indirect and only direct if women act as men).
19. See id. (highlighting the importance of women as sources of inspiration for
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Theoretically speaking, women stand outside, or on the periphery of,
masculine creation. If creative work, either scientific or artistic, is to
be protected legally, it will on balance be the work of men.20
If women seek to engage in cultural production, the dualism
inherent in relations between the sexes requires them to do so on
masculine terms.21 Women, for the most part, cannot see themselves
outside a culture already “saturated with male bias.”22 This political
economy of cultural creation and innovation disparages and
marginalizes women’s contributions to culture.23 The process of
scientific discovery is also constructed through the male gaze.24 Given
that there is no neutral starting place for an examination of cultural
creation, intellectual property law itself is premised upon assumptions
of creative work favoring the male creator.
Firestone’s argument opens up an interesting insight into the
production of knowledge as a gendered practice. Women can choose
to participate on terms constructed by men, but these terms are
considered neutral. The production of knowledge is territorialized,
and entrance is based upon gender. Without a gendered analysis of
how knowledge is constructed, women who choose to participate in
knowledge construction are often branded inferior simply because of
their gender.25 Feminist historical analysis suggests that women were
systematically excluded from sites of production, and, as assorted
crafts became masculine territory, women were not given the
opportunity to develop knowledge in those fields.26 Culture and
men, especially in the field of art).
20. See id. at 176-77 (arguing that men set cultural standards).
21. See id. at 178 (asserting that women view the world in masculine terms
because of the prevailing male culture).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 177 (commenting that few women have contributed directly to
culture).
And in those cases where individual women have participated in male
culture, they have had to do so on male terms. And it shows. Because they
have had to compete as men, in a male game—while still being pressured to
prove themselves in their old female roles, a role at odds with their selfappointed ambitions—it is not surprising that they are seldom as skilled as
men at the game of culture.
Id.
24. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 30-31 (discussing feminist critiques of science
that stem from the systematic exclusion of women from participation in serious
science).
25. See FIRESTONE, supra note 1, at 193 (stating that the absence of women from
scientific discipline is often illogically attributed to some deficiency on the part of
women).
26. See MERCHANT, supra note 17, at 152 (describing how throughout the
sixteenth century women lost access to a variety of trades and crafts and the
knowledge associated with their production). Specifically, statutes that limited the
numbers of persons engaged in baking, butchering, and fish-mongering denied
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innovation as male territory is asserted and maintained using the
circular argument that women by definition cannot participate
meaningfully in knowledge or cultural production.
Liberal feminists who argue for the equal participation of women
often do so without questioning the underlying assumptions
associated with how we construct knowledge.27 They argue that
women can participate as men on male defined territory.28 However,
it is necessary to dig deeper and understand the way in which
knowledge itself is structured as masculine. Women need to develop
a way of seeing themselves not already defined by men.29
Investigations into feminist epistemology help to uncover the power
involved in the construction of knowledge by asserting that there is no
“neutral” field of knowledge production and the status quo is by no
means a universally applicable framework, but one of many possible
avenues for knowledge construction.30
When radical second wave feminists were constructing their
epistemological arguments, they were in part attempting to create
grounds for the construction of knowledge for and by women.31 For
many early feminists, the construction of culture as masculine was a
central claim.32
Clearly, this epistemological framework has
implications for how we view the idea of intellectual property. If the
women’s access to these professions. Id. By the seventeenth century, women had also
lost control over brewing and were increasingly marginalized in midwifery as well. Id.
at 152-53. This severely circumscribed women’s productive opportunities. Id.; see
also FIRESTONE, supra note 1, at 192-93 (noting the lack of women at all levels of the
scientific disciplines).
27. JANICE MCLAUGHLIN, FEMINIST SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES AND DIALOGUES 25 (2003) (arguing that during the second wave of feminism
feminists began criticizing liberal feminists as privileging “masculine ways of being”;
see also GRANT, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting Jean Bethke Elshtain, who characterizes
second wave liberal feminists as asking the question, “Why can’t women be more like
men?”).
28. KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: VISIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FEMINIST
THEORY 26 (1993) (describing the conflict between liberal and radical feminists as
one between trying to integrate women into already existing institutions versus trying
to change those institutions).
29. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 144 (stressing that self-knowledge for women is
important if a feminist science is to replace the current culture of knowledge that
exists).
30. See id. at 141-42 (identifying the various feminist epistemologies as possible
avenues for providing alternate views of nature).
31. Second wave feminist Kate Millet demonstrates that understanding knowledge
and culture as masculine constructions is not unique to Firestone. See generally KATE
MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS (Univ. of Illinois Press 2000) (1969) (arguing that one can
only understand politics by examining gender relationships constructed within a
system of patriarchy, an ideology that dominates our understanding of psychology,
economics, family structures, and biology).
32. See VALERIE BRYSON, FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 198-201
(2d ed. 2003) (observing that many of the early feminists, like Firestone and Millet,
differed on many points, but agreed that knowledge has been constructed as male).
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very construction of knowledge that is the basis for claims to copyright
and patent protection is gendered, then what is protected is the
outgrowth of a gendered system rendered invisible until a feminist
lens sheds light on the politics of this otherwise “neutral”
construction.
The construction of culture, knowledge, science, politics, and
public life as masculine is premised upon the public/private
distinction significant in understanding the traditional place of
women in the world.33 Feminists have done considerable work
clarifying the dualisms of male/female and public/private.34 If, as
feminists have argued, knowledge is constructed from a male point of
view, then it follows that it must be possible to articulate a feminist
epistemology—an alternative to a masculine epistemology that
masquerades as a universal mode of being.35 These feminist
epistemologies, according to Sandra Harding, “can be used to
undercut the legitimacy of the modernist epistemologies, which
explicitly ignore gender while implicitly exploiting distinctively
masculine meanings of knowledge-seeking.”36 A women’s way of
knowing is an alternative to a status quo premised upon an exclusively
masculine tradition.37 Articulating a women’s standpoint is a political
activity that provides us with a different understanding of creative
work and how it should be protected by law.
B. Feminist Epistemologies and Seeking Alternatives
There are several epistemological arguments that allow us to
examine the construction of knowledge from a feminist standpoint.
These are especially important for understanding what feminists
might protect with intellectual property law and what remains outside
the boundaries of protection. Each epistemological starting point has
some relevance to the issue of intellectual property and the
construction of knowledge.38
33. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL
POLITICAL THOUGHT 4-6 (2d ed. 1993) (asserting that women have long been
relegated to the private sphere while the public sphere has been seen as the natural
space for men).
34. See id. at 201-04 (summarizing different feminists’ attempts to re-define the
public and private spheres).
35. See generally HARDING, supra note 7 (concentrating on articulating a feminist
epistemology and surveying feminist thought as it relates to feminist epistemology).
36. Id. at 141.
37. See GRANT, supra note 4, at 41-45 (describing the evolution of an
understanding of knowledge as gendered).
38. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 142 (suggesting that the various feminist
epistemologies provide understandings of nature that are lacking from a men’s
perspective).
AND
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First, a feminist epistemology can be grounded in an examination
of craft labor done by women. Craft labor focuses on labor
performed by women involving “caring”—the labor of the hand,
brain, and heart.39 Women’s labor networks people together in social
structures by moving beyond labor as a commodity to labor as an act
of care.40 This predominantly female type of knowledge construction
can be contrasted to “industrialized labor,” which is claimed to be
primarily masculine in construction.41 Industrialized labor exists
within a system of production that generates knowledge in the
abstract sense, instead of placing knowledge within social
relationships.42 Women historically have been shut out of the
industrial system of knowledge production, a system that takes place
in factories, laboratories, and research institutes.43
Masculine
knowledge exists within a capitalist mode of production, dividing
subject from object and knower from the known. What men do for
recognition, women do for love.44
A second epistemological feminist standpoint argues that when
knowledge is constructed as abstract and rational, a gendered
dynamic is at work.45 This argument claims that the abstract and
rational knowledge is associated with the masculine, while a relational
39. See id. at 142-43. (developing the argument that the thoughts and practices of
women scientists are examples of a distinct feminist theory of knowledge because they
incorporate caring labor).
40. See id. (quoting Hilary Rose who describes women’s labor as “caring” labor).
41. See id. at 142 (describing craft labor as a unification of “manual, mental, and
emotional” activity and, therefore, reflective of a feminist theory of knowledge).
42. See id. at 145.
43. See id. at 143.
[F]eminist epistemology cannot originate in meditations upon what women
do in laboratories, since the women there are forced to deny that they are
women in order to survive, yet are still ‘by and large shut out of the
production system of scientific knowledge, with its ideological power to
define what is and what is not objective knowledge’.
Id.
44. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23-24
(1988).
[F]eminist artists, historians, anthropologists have been the first to show
concern and respect for the crafts of the midwives and grandmothers, the
anonymous work of women's hands, the oral culture of women sitting in the
kitchens, the traditional arts and remedies passed on from mother to
daughter, the female culture never granted the reverence accorded to ‘high
art.’ . . . And so we can both take pride in all that women have done for
‘love’—including the resourceful, heroic coping of ordinary women
everywhere—and also ask ‘Why should women, and women only, work for
love only?’
Id. (quoting ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE, 260-63 (1979) (citation
omitted)).
45. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 148 (quoting Nancy Hartstock’s assertion that
adult labor is divided between masculinity and femininity).
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epistemology is associated with the feminine.46 It is important to
recognize that feminists see this binary perception of knowledge not
as an essential characteristic of women and men, but as a political
construct that privileges one way of thinking and doing over
another.47 A masculine social construction of knowledge means that
women and men primarily participate in an already determined
system framed by masculinity.
The ability to define one way of knowing as the only way of
knowing, or the best way of knowing, is a question of domination and
power. Many feminists want to deconstruct the power/domination
relationship and suggest alternative methods for understanding
relationships based upon reciprocal empowerment.48 A feminist way
of knowing emphasizes the relationships built, rather than dominion
over others. It seeks to value multiple ways of knowing instead of
privileging one over the other. Thus, instead of replacing a masculine
epistemology with a feminine epistemology, feminist scholarship seeks
to transcend the binary altogether and create a new attitude towards
knowledge that will value the abstract as well as the relational. The
construction of a women’s epistemological standpoint has political
power because it makes it possible to see that another way of thinking
about the world is possible.
The abstract and rational construction of knowledge can be
interpreted psychoanalytically as well.49 This psychoanalytic approach
suggests that masculine individuality is defined by what it is not—it is
defined against women as the other. Ironically, seeking to distinguish
yourself from your mother is not motivated by “rational” behavior at
all. The feminist argument is that to move towards a successor to a
masculine knowledge, is to move away from a knowledge constructed
as “always defined exclusively against women.”50 Both men and
women need to move away from the construction of knowledge as
46. See id.
47. Joan Scott, Deconstruction Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 134, 134 (Marianne
Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds. 1990) (arguing that we need to construct a feminist
theory that allows us to “break the conceptual hold, at least, of those long traditions
of [Western] philosophy that have systematically and repeatedly constructed the
world hierarchically in terms of masculine universals and feminine specificities”).
48. See id. at 149 (summarizing Hartstock, writing, “[a]gainst power as
domination over others, feminist thinking and organizational practices express the
possibility of power as the provision of energy to others as well as self, and of
reciprocal empowerment”).
49. See id. at 152 (arguing that “[w]ere women not exclusively the humans
against whom infant males develop their senses of a separate and individuated self,
‘human knowledge’ would not be so preoccupied with infantile separation and
individuation dilemmas”).
50. Id.
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“other” towards a reciprocal understanding of knowledge. It is worth
reiterating that such a move is not linked to women or men
categorically, but is a standpoint that either women or men can
appropriate in order to view knowledge in a different and, as feminists
would argue, better and more constructive light. The goal of
investigating feminist epistemologies is not to argue that there is a
superior female way of knowing, but rather is to contribute to the
process of creating a “successor epistemology” that will lead to a
gender-neutral construction of knowledge, where both women and
men can function and where both women and men create their
futures within a “degendered social order.”51
How might these epistemological frameworks be related to
intellectual property? Two examples help highlight the values
associated with women’s creative work and can lead to an alternative
view of the way intellectual property may look from a gendered
perspective. The first example highlights the difference between craft
and industrialized knowledge and illustrates the differences in
knowledge construction.52 Knitting has long been considered a craft
enterprise associated with women’s work.53 Virtually all knitters are
women. There is a long history of sharing patterns among knitters,
knitting is often communicated from parent or grandparent to child,
and knitting circles were a popular method of doing productive labor
while enjoying the company of other women.54 Within the past few
years, knitters have noticed changes in the world of knitting. Where
once patterns were published in easy-to-share formats with little
concern for copyright, today’s knitting patterns come with strict
prohibitions regarding sharing, copying, and producing knitted
material for commercial purposes.55
In other words, copyright has entered the world of knitting
patterns, a world assumed by many involved as a communal source of
knowledge to share. Patterns have been appropriated into the larger

51. HARDING, supra note 7, at 146.
52. Thanks to Hillary Warren in the Department of Communications at Otterbein
College for suggesting this example.
53. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 142 (discussing the basis of Hilary Rose’s
feminist epistemology, where an activity that engages the hand, brain, and heart is
characteristic of craft labor and women’s work in general).
54. See generally Jean Rutter, Fellowship for the Fiber-Fixated, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2004, at G4 (commenting on the newfound resurgence of knitting despite its long
tradition).
55. See The Girl from Auntie, Copyright for Crafters: About the Knitter’s Guide
to Copyright, [hereinafter Knitter’s Guide], http://girlfromauntie.com/copyright
(last updated Dec. 28, 2004) (discussing the growing awareness of intellectual
property rights among knitters and crafters and the increasingly complex legal issues
that may arise from borrowing others’ patterns).
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industrialized process of publishing for profit.56 It is now common to
find regulations on what a pattern might be used for.57 For example,
the pattern may claim that it can be used to knit a sweater for
personal use but cannot be used to knit a sweater to sell. These
patterns also claim that one cannot share the pattern with friends, as
so many patterns in the past were shared. If some commercial pattern
manufacturers have their way, used patterns will not be available for
sale 58 despite the first sale doctrine.59
While the knitting circles and community remain primarily female
(public and shared), the ownership of knowledge about patterns has
been appropriated into the dominant mode of production—it has
been privatized. Patterns are sold, not to further the culture of
knitting, but to maximize profit. As a result, much of the old
community of knitting is being replaced with a marketplace of
knitting, where knitters “steal” patterns if they do not each buy a
pattern individually or if they use it in a way not deemed appropriate
by the copyright owner.60 A feminine way of producing knowledge
within the realm of craft has been replaced with a way of producing
knowledge that emphasizes abstract originality and authorship in the
production of knowledge, instead of the relations built into culture
and custom.
It is important to note that women (who need not be feminists)
may operate in either paradigm and that many of those constructing
these copyrighted patterns are women. Feminists, however, would
argue that the women’s way of knowing, illustrated by the tradition of
56. See Halbert, supra note 9, at 113, 117 (noting that the American system of
copyright, with its masculinized process and focus on profit and production, is in
direct conflict with the communal ideas of property).
57. See Rutter, supra note 54, at G4 (noting the success by many knitting pattern
creators, such as Bonne Marie Burns and Jenna Wilson, in selling downloadable
patterns).
58. See Metafilter, Selling a Used Item as a Copyright Infringement?, http://
www.metafilter.com/comments.mefi/21960 (last visited July 26, 2006) (noting that
some in knitting circles are troubled by knitting pattern and yarn design, and
production company Alice Starmore, Inc.’s requests to Ebay that the web
clearinghouse take down pages by knitters selling her used patterns and yarn); see
also Virtual Yarns, Alice Starmore Classics, http://www.virtualyarns.com/
designs/classics.asp (last visited July 26, 2006) (detailing the inspiration behind her
designs). Ironically, Starmore’s designs are all premised upon the rich cultural
heritage of her Scottish lineage and traditional Celtic designs; however, using the
language of individual authorship and originality, she quickly ignores the traditions
upon which she draws in favor of a language of private property based on the
exclusion of others. See Virtual Yarns, Design Showroom, http://www.virtualyarns.
com/designs/default.asp (describing her approach to original design).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a) (providing control by the copyright owner over the
first sale of a copyrighted item but limiting control over this item after the first sale).
The first sale doctrine allows businesses such as used book and record shops to exist.
Id.
60. See Knitter’s Guide, supra note 55.
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knitting, should be used as the source for articulating and
understanding a different method of constructing knowledge—one
not contingent upon the abstract individual and original author, but
one centered in relationships of care.61 After all, the pattern is only
part of the creative process. The individual who does the knitting
makes changes to the design, picks the colors of the yarn, and invests
her unique motivation into the knitting process.62 The creative act of
knitting transcends the pattern; yet, as copyright invades and
colonizes this space, its users attempt to appropriate for themselves
the claim to original creativity and seek to control the activity well
beyond the construction of a pattern.63 A feminist epistemology
premised upon the craft mentality provides a standpoint from which
to critique the method of producing (and consuming) knowledge
exemplified by an industrialized and commodified process.
Quilting provides a second example of “intellectual property” that
developed outside the productive world of abstract authorship and
within the framework of a network of sharing and care, thus
illustrating the theoretical claims made by those endorsing a feminist
epistemology. Given that women’s stories are often excluded from
“traditional” history, contemporary scholars have turned to unique
places to understand the lives of women. For example, one important
source for understanding history, artistic, and cultural production and
the development of what can be called a women’s way of creating can
be found in the growing literature on the history of quilting. Quilts
are increasingly read as women’s history because the knowledge
sewed into their patterns not only tells stories of the women who
made them, but transformations in quilting also mark changes in the
status of women over time.
Sewing was an essential skill learned at an early age by the majority
of girls and some boys.64 In the nineteenth century, quilt-making was
just one example of women’s work considered essential to the
household, serving very functional purposes. Quilts were not assigned
the status of “original” given that the primary purpose of quilting was
61. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 148 (observing that it is women’s relational
activity and approach to life that allows women to attain knowledge and information
not accessible through “men’s characteristic activities”).
62. See Jenna Wilson, Copyright [A Primer for Knitters], http://knitty.com/
ISSUEfall03/FEATcopyright.html (last visited July 6, 2005) (noting that stitch
patterns in a sweater, even in a traditional design, can be a copyrightable work of
artistic craftsmanship).
63. See id. (explaining that knitting techniques are not protected by copyright,
but that an author’s expression of those techniques can be copyright protected).
64. See PAT FERRERO ET AL., HEARTS AND HANDS: THE INFLUENCE OF WOMEN AND
QUILTS ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 16, 26 (1987) (noting that sewing was an essential skill
taught to children as young as two or three).
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functional, therefore they could not earn copyright protection. As
the position of women within the household changed during the
nineteenth century, so did the focus on sewing and quilting. Even as
most productive jobs were moving outside the household, the “cult of
domesticity” prescribed sewing as an essential aspect of women’s
work.65 Integral to the place of women in the home was the
understanding that sewing was the essence of the “feminine.” Women
like Mary Wollstonecraft were considered “immodest” because of their
work for women’s rights.66 By contrast, women who sewed were
developing appropriate feminine skills and retained their sense of
place.67
Instead of simply providing functional blankets, women now also
quilted more intricate patterns and designs. These designs were
taken from popular magazines and defined as works of “leisure” for
women.68 Women who quilted became status symbols for their
husbands because they had the time to spend on quilting instead of
working.69 As the quilts became less functional, they certainly did not
take any less labor. Instead, the act of quilting was transformed from
a vital function for the household into an activity to do in one’s spare
time. While remaining essential to “civilizing” the home, these more
decorative quilts were not seen as works of original authorship.70
Unlike early utilitarian quilt production, these more artistic quilts
could be bought as kits, but there is no evidence they were treated as
works of authorship in the same sense as literary works of the same
period. While these artistic quilts may have been displayed in the
common living areas of a house in order to highlight women’s
“leisure” time, they remained domestic objects, not serious works of
art.
Unlike the notion of the romantic author that had emerged to
assert ownership of the written text, the culture of quilting remained
collective and integrated into the everyday lives of women. Women
came together and developed friendships over quilts. Multiple
65. See id.
66. See id. (commenting that in the eyes of rural societies, “‘immodest’ women
were those crusading feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft or Frances Wright who spoke
in public and wrote books agitating for female equality”).
67. See id. at 26-27 (remarking on how the meaning of sewing changed from
being that of a practical skill to a specific characteristic of femininity).
68. See id. at 27 (observing that the advice literature of the period promulgated
sewing as a means to develop proper decorum in young girls, which included modesty
and quiet manners).
69. See id. at 25 (explaining that decorative quilts emphasized the fact that
women quilted for pleasure, not necessity).
70. It would be interesting to find copies of these original quilt patterns that
could be purchased to see what the copyrights on the quilts might be.
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women would work on a single quilt, thus confounding our modern
understanding of authorship and possibly even joint authorship.
Quilts were made as gifts for families and to commemorate special
occasions.71 While it is possible to associate many quilts with their
makers, the narrative of authorship of quilts is much less associated
with the individual author than it is for literary texts. Certainly, the
creative work of a quilt is similar to that of any other form of
authorship. The designs reflect originality, and the sophisticated use
of color to create the intended effect is an artistic talent. However,
their creation as collective projects, as gifts, and always with the intent
of care, suggests another model for authorship.
Quilts often include stories sewn into their squares, they utilize
important knowledge of textiles and appliqué techniques, and they
have served important political and cultural functions.72 However,
their place as utilitarian objects, and as products of the work of
women, has often meant that most are lost to contemporary history.73
Additionally, because quilts were historically created within the
culture of feminine sharing, issues of authorship were not associated
with the abstract notion of author protected by copyright. Certainly,
women took great pride in the creation of these quilts, but these
quilts existed within a different paradigm of ownership—one that
attempted to solidify connections between people, not divide people
by property boundaries.
Both quilting and knitting, primarily women’s ways of creating,
have existed outside copyright law and developed as collective
enterprises, perhaps because the romantic author and the desire for
profit were not central to the process of creation. Examining these
activities provides insight into how a world of creativity outside the
realm of copyright law might exist, at least until the process of
quilting and/or knitting becomes commodified and appropriated
into a system of commercial production. These noncommercial and
sharing cultures need not be exclusively female. However, because
women’s work has historically been discounted as less creative or
innovative,74 examples of sharing cultures are more likely to be found
71. See PATRICIA COOPER & NORMA BRADLEY ALLEN, THE QUILTERS: WOMEN AND
DOMESTIC ART, AN ORAL HISTORY 15, 17 (Texas Tech Univ. Press 1999) (1989)
(documenting the quilting practices of a group of rural Texan women). Many of the
quilts produced by these women were specifically designed as gifts. Id.
72. See FERRERO, supra note 64, at 47 (noting that “[i]n their narrative concept,
format and technique, [the quilts illustrated on the adjacent page] clearly hark back
to the traditional appliquéd tapestries of Dahomey in western Africa”).
73. See id. (praising Jennie Smith’s foresight in recording the description of a
quilt maker’s firsthand account of her vision of the quilt).
74. See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT 38 (1993) (noting that the historical perception of authorship, as
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in
female-dominated
subcultures
that
have
escaped
75
commodification.
Arguments about feminist epistemologies are not meant to suggest
that women as women will always see creative work as collective or an
act of care. Women can be as motivated by profit-making as men.76
However, the feminist standpoint does suggest there are alternatives
to intellectual property that can be used by both women and men
who seek to escape what is often considered the only possible path to
protect creative work—intellectual property law.
The relational attitude becomes quite revolutionary when applied
to the “products” of knowledge called “intellectual property.” Once
one stops privileging the abstract and rational and seeks out the
relational in cultural creation and innovation, it is clear that a
paradigm of intellectual property that creates rigid boundaries to
sharing stands in the way of a relational approach to knowledge
creation, one in which care and the work of the heart can play a role.
A feminist critique from this perspective is a quite radical critique of
the boundaries established by intellectual property law, which typically
are boundaries that seek only to divide and control instead of
facilitate exchange.
The applicability of these epistemological standpoints highlights
possible feminist interpretations of intellectual property. If the very
construction of knowledge is masculine, then it follows that the rules
protecting the ownership of knowledge, such as patents and
copyrights, emerge from a system of knowledge production that does
not recognize reciprocity, but rather emphasizes the abstract and
individuated male.77 Both women and men are alienated within such
a system because the framework itself remains invisible. However, the
structure privileges masculine forms and disregards the type of labor
and knowledge practiced by women until the time, as is the case with

exemplified in the paternity metaphor of the author as begetter and the book as
child, was seen as belonging in the realm of masculine work and activity).
75. See generally Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, The Ethical Reaches of
Authorship, 95 THE S. ATLANTIC Q. 947, 967-68 (1996) (discussing the foundations of
the romantic author as premised upon individual creativity at the expense of the
collaborative methods in which authorship is more likely to occur).
76. See DEBORAH LINDSAY WILLIAMS, NOT IN SISTERHOOD: EDITH WHARTON, WILLA
CATHER, ZONA GALE, AND THE POLITICS OF FEMALE AUTHORSHIP 3-4 (2001) (noting that
women writers did create huge profits for their editors and publishers as well as
themselves); see also Natalie Danford, Feminist Publishing for Fun and Profit,
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY Oct. 6, 2003, at 18 (indicating that women are responding to new
competitive publishing environments, as exemplified by the Feminist Press).
77. See generally West, supra note 44, at 32 (noting that many radical feminists
see the loss of boundaries, most often experienced by women, to be the source of
oppression instead of something to value).
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knitting, that a commercial value might be found.78 Both men and
women can profit from the system of knowledge that feminists argue
is a masculine construction, but the feminist standpoint allows us to
build a bridge to an alternative understanding of knowledge and the
types of knowledge that become valuable.
Feminists argue that women’s labor “relieves men of the need to
take care of their bodies or of the local places where they exist,
freeing them to immerse themselves in the world of abstract
concepts.”79 Thus, when a feminist lens is applied to the construction
of knowledge, it becomes clear that isolated, original, and individual
works of authorship are impossible—they come at the price of a
gender dualism.
The move away from this particular social
construction of knowledge requires us to understand these
underlying principles.
The social construction of knowledge is one possible feminist
interpretation that helps us look at intellectual property differently.
There are other avenues that may also be explored. One such avenue
is the substantial literature on women and authorship that has
developed, which provides interesting feminist insights into
authorship and ownership. Additionally, postmodern feminism and
the critique of texts available through a postmodern lens open up new
avenues for a feminist interpretation of intellectual property.
II. WOMEN AS AUTHORS, WOMEN AS TEXTS
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of the
author underwent a transformation.80 The focus shifted from the text
to the author as original genius and authority of the work. It was not
uncommon for early texts to be published anonymously, either to
avoid attribution of controversial political ideas,81 or because
authorship was not seen as essential to the text.82 It was not
78. See id. at 33 (commenting on the radical feminist perspective that no respect
for boundaries, in terms of bodily integrity, is part of the problem women face).
79. HARDING, supra note 7, at 156.
80. See John Feather, The Commerce of Letters: The Study of the EighteenthCentury Book Trade, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 405, 418 (1984) (commenting
that there is still much to be learned about the status of authors during the
eighteenth century).
81. See Rose, supra note 74, at 34 (providing the example of Defoe, who
advocated for a law against anonymous authorship so those writing “offending books
might be known and punished”); see also Feather, supra note 80, at 418-19 (arguing
that the increased circulation of texts during the eighteenth century made it much
more difficult for the state to act as a censor, especially as the book trade became
more international).
82. See Lisa Maruca, Political Propriety and Feminine Property: Women in the
Eighteenth-Century Text Trades, 34 STUD. IN THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 79, 82-83
(2001) (arguing that another reason for anonymous authorship during the
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uncommon for printers and booksellers to hire writers—either
through discrete third parties or through their network of alliances
within the trade—whose identities remained unknown to them.
Although this did increase the bookseller’s liability because the chain
of responsibility ended with him, it also increased his control over his
investment, especially in an economic and legal climate in which views
on intellectual property were changing.83 The professionalization of
writing and the desire on the part of authors to monopolize revenues
from the book trade helped change the ways in which authorship was
constructed.84 As the late eighteenth century debates over perpetual
copyright suggest, capturing the profits generated by works of
authorship motivated many authors to make arguments about the
nature of writing.85 Arguments regarding the author as the creator of
original works manifesting a unique personality were made to justify
copyright ownership.86 The primary sense in which authorship
functions is by endorsing a system resting on the “conviction of
ourselves as individuals.”87
Interestingly, the language used to construct the romantic author
took on a gendered quality, as did debates over who might be
considered “authentic” authors versus “prostitutes of the pen.”88 Poet
eighteenth century deals with the better ability of publishers to control the work if the
author remained unknown and thus not linked to what could otherwise be seen as
their property).
83. See id. (observing that significant factors driving anonymous authorship were
the economic and political implications surrounding the publishing process).
84. See ROSE, supra note 74, at 118 (suggesting that lying underneath the surface
of eighteenth-century literary discussions of a writing’s worth was its commodity
value).
85. See generally id. (describing the different approaches taken by authors to
justify their perpetual ownership).
86. See SONIA HOFKOSH, SEXUAL POLITICS AND THE ROMANTIC AUTHOR 15 (1998)
(proposing that the poet Samuel Coleridge was active in asserting a romantic form of
authorship, which claimed writing as the expression of the creative and unique self);
see also ROSE, supra note 74, at 137 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), where the Court
affirmed copyright protection for an advertisement containing a depiction). In
Bleistein, Justice Holmes reasoned that even if the depiction was a direct copy of a
real performance, “[t]he copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible.” Id.
87. See ROSE, supra note 74, at 138-39 (surmising that while legal fictions are still
sometimes useful, it is the notion of authors as individuals which drives the whole
system of copyright); see also Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary
Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 314-15 (1992);
Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 285, 288-89 (1992)
88. See HOFKOSH, supra note 86, at 16 (indicating that Coleridge’s question of
literary property, while on the surface not a question of gender, is nonetheless a
question that cannot be asked without also contemplating the question of what
women want).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss3/1

18

Halbert: Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property

2006]

FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS

449

Samuel Coleridge was vocal about his interpretation of authorship
and those not worthy of the title “author.”89 The construction of
authorship and readers within the growing marketplace in books was
explicitly gendered.
Coleridge found it important to create
distinctions between authentic authors, like himself, and those who
were tainted by the company of women.90 In making these
distinctions, Coleridge sought to criticize those aspects of literary
culture he did not consider of appropriate artistic content, primarily
texts whose predominant audience (and often authors) were
women.91
The distinctions created between authentic and
inauthentic authorship premised upon the romantic notion of
birthing original ideas was possible at that time, because a masculine
sense of authorship was privileged and placed in opposition to
“promiscuous company.”92
Inherent in the discourse on literature and authorship throughout
the eighteenth century was a concern about the feminization of
literature.93 As literacy among women grew, and increased numbers
of women took up the pen to write, women were met with resistance
on the part of the male authors who resented and were threatened by
the growing numbers of female authors.94
Literary societies,
organized by women, and circulating libraries, used by both men and
women, but almost exclusively associated with women, were thought
to encourage promiscuity.95 It was thought that there was something
inherently wrong with a woman who engaged in the circulation of
texts or the criticism of these texts.96 If authorship as ownership has
been constructed in the masculine terms of territory and original
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 18 (examining Coleridge’s objection to those features he deemed as
differentiators in a writing career, “anonymous critics, newspapers, advertisements,
and the ‘novels and tales of chivalry’ produced for and often by women,” that is, those
features that are “reproducible and replaceable features of literary culture”).
92. See ROSE, supra note 75, at 38 (commenting on how even the metaphors used
to understand authorship framed writing in masculine terms). An author was
“shepherd, tiller of the soil, vessel of divine inspiration, magician, and monarch.” Id.
93. See TERRY CASTLE, BOSS LADIES, WATCH OUT! ESSAYS ON WOMEN, SEX, AND
WRITING 4-5 (2002) (explaining that throughout the eighteenth-century the notion
that literary judgment was largely “a privilege reserved for men” prevailed and that
women writers “represented a new and destabilizing force” in the marketplace).
94. See id. at 5 (suggesting that eighteenth century traditionalists saw the female
critic as the “most blatant example of woman’s new and overweening literary
ambition”).
95. See HOFKOSH, supra note 86, at 20 (discussing how libraries provided a forum
for women to engage in “social gossip”).
96. WENDY WALL, THE IMPRINT OF GENDER: AUTHORSHIP AND PUBLICATION IN THE
ENGLISH RENAISSANCE, 279-340 (outlining the problems faced by women who sought
to write, including links between female writers and harlotry).
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male genius, then the role women played as authors should be
examined more closely.
“Literature” was established as a male domain; great works of
literature were not written by women—an idea only deconstructed by
feminist literary critics in the past forty years or so.97 The gendered
nature of traditional literature points to the role of women as “other,”
the all-encompassing entity against which men act.98 I would argue,
this sense of the other applies to any discussion of authorship where
creative and literary work is assumed to be authored by men while
women traditionally remained excluded from the canon. In other
words, there is a political economy of authorship that has a gendered
component.
The following focus on gender, literature, and
authorship helps highlight the importance of these issues for a
feminist interpretation of intellectual property. William Hazlitt, for
example, published his first book, An Essay on the Principle of
Human Action, claiming, “no woman ever read, or would ever
comprehend the meaning of [it].”99 Joseph Hergesheimer wrote in
1921, “literature in the United States was ‘being strangled with a
petticoat.’”100 What is astonishing about quotes such as these is not
the suggestion that women might be unable to understand the work,
but that male authors feel the need to stake out territory in such a way
that they hope to exclude women. While such a statement reveals
much about the male author and the need to establish legitimacy
through superiority over women, it says little about women as scholars
or readers.
In order to succeed in a male dominated field, many women
throughout the early twentieth century tried to assimilate into the
already existing masculine culture.101 Historically, to be a female
97. See TORIL MOI, SEXUAL/TEXTUAL POLITICS: FEMINIST LITERARY THEORY 54-55
(1985) (arguing that it is important to evaluate how the concept of greatness in
literature has often been used to exclude women from the canon). Early feminist
criticism focused on the literary works of men to highlight the pervasive inequality of
gender relations. Id.; see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 199-253 (1989)
(offering a feminist critique of the work of Montherlant, D.H. Lawrence, Claudel,
Breton and Stendhal). See generally MILLET, supra note 31 (offering literary critiques
of D.H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, Norman Mailer, and Jean Genet).
98. See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 97, at 197-98.
He projects upon her what he desires and what he fears, what he loves and
what he hates. And if it is so difficult to say anything specific about her, that
is because man seeks the whole of himself in her and because she is All. She
is All, that is, on the plane of the inessential; she is all the Other. And, as the
other, she is other than herself, other than what is expected of her.
Id.
99. HOFKOSH, supra note 86, at 104.
100. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 3-4.
101. See id. at 5 (arguing that Wharton and Cather attempted to transcend their
gender in part by situating their own work within the masculine tradition).
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author was to produce “mass cultural” objects, not to be an
“authentic” writer, and female authors struggled to overcome these
arbitrary barriers.102 An important conclusion that can be drawn
from the gendered nature of the discussion over texts is that literary
work and literary genius were initially only possible for men—a
circular argument at best—therefore, the work of women was typically
seen as second rate.103 In fact, earlier female literary critics were lost
to obscurity.104
Despite the articulation of original authorship, works of literature,
and literary criticism as male territory, women today have entered the
public sphere as authors and critics and have staked a claim to the
title “author.”105 In doing so, women authors have both appropriated
the already constructed masculine notion of the author as an
individual creator and attempted to assert new modes of authorship
and publication. While often their works are denigrated as not
“serious” literature, it is also the case that many female authors earn
their living from a system of copyright established to protect the rights
of authors. While early debates over copyright protection were often
framed in terms of male authors needing copyright in order to
provide for their otherwise helpless wives and children,106 female
authors can also benefit from the system.
Female artists, operating under the authorial paradigm established
in the seventeenth century, will seek to protect their “property” from
improper use, will see these works as the extension of their
personality, and will wish to be seen as the authors of their works.
Thus, while some feminists may critique a system of property
ownership in what has come to be known as “intellectual property,”
other feminists who conceptualize themselves as authors may assign
value to a system of property rights that protects their work.107 While
102. See id. (postulating that for Nietzche and other turn-of-the-century male
intellectuals, women were associated with the “inauthenticities of mass culture”).
103. See CASTLE, supra note 93, at 16 (noting that female critics, especially those
who criticized male works, were also held in high disdain and seen as trespassers into
masculine territory).
104. See id. at 20 (remarking that after 1800, literary criticism became increasingly
professionalized and the territory of men).
105. See Shawn St. Jean, Hanging “The Yellow Wallpaper”: Feminism and Textual
Studies, 28 FEMINIST STUDIES 397, 398 (2002) (suggesting that because some feminist
writers have been provided with legitimacy as authors, it is time to focus upon
defining “authoritative” texts more closely).
106. ROSE, supra note 75, at 40 (discussing the argument by London booksellers
and authors that piracy was destroying their livelihoods and helping to develop a
concept of authorial property).
107. Feminists may also wish to lay claim to the language of authorial genius and
originality as St. Jean does when discussing the ways in which one ought to interpret
Gilman’s The Yellow Wallpaper. See St. Jean, supra note 105, at 398.
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some feminists problematize the construction of authorship, others
may suggest that owning property is itself an important feminist right.
Because of women’s past (and sometimes present) position as
property, it is likely that many feminists will advocate, at the very least,
a theory of female economic and personal autonomy.108
Furthermore, women’s autonomy may manifest itself in arguments
about ownership of property and the creation of a sphere of bodily
integrity.109 In other words, the ownership of private property, and by
extension intellectual property, is likely to be equally appealing to
contemporary feminists as it would be to men.
However, one might also imagine feminist critics using the starting
point of women as property to critique the notion of private property
in favor of a less rigid understanding of ownership of tangible things.
From this perspective, much as with copyright, it is possible for
feminists to offer an underlying critique of the idea of private
property that one day may transform a system of property that
continues to work more in favor of men than of women.110
In an effort to examine private property through a feminist lens,
one could argue that the seemingly “rational” world of property
discourse is in effect a story where not all actors can be predicted to
behave in the name of rational self-interest.111 Specifically, women as
mothers will most likely not order moral choices about property in a
manner that will only benefit themselves to the exclusion of others
(the otherwise “rational” choice).112
108. See Bina Agarwal, Gender, Property, and Land Rights: Bridging a Critical Gap
in Economic Analysis and Policy, in OUT OF THE MARGIN: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
ECONOMICS 264, 264 (Edith Kuiper & Jolande Sap eds., 1995) (arguing that land
rights are a crucial part of women’s autonomy in South Asia); see also Renée
Hirschon, Introduction: Property, Power and Gender Relations, in WOMEN AND
PROPERTY- WOMEN AS PROPERTY 1, 17-19 (Renee Hirschon ed., 1984) (concluding that
property rights are socially constructed and typically less available to women).
109. In many ways, arguments over reproductive rights are over bodily integrity
and ownership of one’s own body.
110. See generally Hirschon, supra note 108 (pointing out that women generally
have more trouble than men in obtaining property rights).
111. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 20, 28-36
(Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing property discourse from a
variety of perspectives, not all of which are motivated entirely by self-interest).
112. See id. at 31 (following Carol Gilligan’s groundbreaking work on moral
development and introducing a character called “Mom,” who views scarce resources
from a “cooperative” perspective according to which each person may take some, or
“pretty much,” but not all of a resource); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 95 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1982) (contending that women’s “morality”
often includes concern or “care” for “both self and other”). See generally SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINK: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 23 (Beacon Press 1995)
(1989) (arguing that women’s relationship to nurturing and care-giving provides a
kind of “maternal thinking” that cannot be calculated using what has been assumed
to be a neutral and universal rational calculation of self interest).
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Women’s interests in property can be viewed as seeking to avoid
becoming the object of property and instead retaining the subjectivity
to own property.113 This deontological position translates into the
world of intellectual property. Subjectivity as a potential property
owner must be acknowledged.114 It is the dehumanizing forces of
turning people into objects that must be resisted. This is where a
feminist critique can be made the most powerful. At a secondary
level, a feminist lens allows us to rethink traditional property in less
absolutist terms and again seek a middle path and/or a balance
between rigid ownership and total lack of control.115 Feminist
analysis of private property may not reject the notion of ownership,
but it does seek to render that idea more complex, multiple and
linked to the larger public domain.116 Feminist presses offer an
example of the problems associated with feminist concepts of
authorship and property.
The publishing industry has traditionally been male dominated and
has led many feminists to seek alternatives to the mainstream
publishing system.117 British feminists fighting for suffrage during
the early twentieth century created feminist presses in order to attack
the “patriarchal cultural hegemony by interrupting men’s discourse
with each other.”118 During the pre-World War I period there were at
least eleven feminist presses operating in London that focused on the
cause of women’s suffrage.119 The most popular of these early
feminist presses, The Woman’s Press, was forced to create new
distribution channels after being vilified by the mainstream maledominated publishing industry.120 Despite their position, feminists
understood the necessity of asserting their own narrative of women’s
113. See Hirschon, supra note 108, at 3 (pointing out that in some cultures,
women are considered “things” and “objects” and are “equated with wealth”).
114. See Agarwal, supra note 108, at 17-19 (noting that, at least for women in
certain geographical locations, owning property is an essential part of women’s
autonomy).
115. See Rose, supra note 111, at 28-36 (proposing such a compromise by
introducing a “cooperative” perspective on property, which she illustrates through
use of a female character called “Mom”).
116. See id. (discussing the “cooperative” perspective on property, which is more
complex than others in that it incorporates a concern for others and a sharing of
resources).
117. See Murray, supra note 11, at 198 (arguing that the American publishing
industry and the process of creating literature as a legitimate pursuit was male
dominated).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 199 (noting that evidence exists that “at least eleven pro-suffrage
presses in addition to the Woman’s Press operat[ed] in London between 1905 and
August 1914”).
120. See id. at 206 (remarking that political forces compelled the Woman’s Press
to publish “non-fiction propaganda pieces”).
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rights and successfully used commercial shops to sell suffrage related
materials.121 Unlike later feminist presses that operated as not-forprofit volunteer organizations, The Woman’s Press successfully raised
money and generated profits.122 However, as later feminist presses
would illustrate, the necessity of creating a voice outside the
mainstream publishing world was integral to articulating a feminist
worldview.123
Feminists wishing to publish in the late 1960s and early 1970s met
similar resistance to those writing in the early twentieth century.124 If
feminist ideas were to be disseminated, alternatives to the mainstream
press, still dominated by men, would have to be found.125 As the
second wave feminist movement took hold in the 1970s, feminists
constructed independent publishing houses in order to bypass the
male dominated publishing industry and, what they saw as, the
commercialization of the book market.126 These publishers relied
heavily upon volunteer hours and collective organizational structures
to distribute feminist texts and explicitly attempted to create an
alternative paradigm for publishing materials.127
Sybylla, an Australian cooperative feminist publishing house,
describes its approach to publishing as, “a wilful disrespect for the
values of commercial publishing.”128 The Feminist Press, begun by
Florence Howe in 1970, saw its mission as publishing the “lost” texts of
female authors—giving them voices that they otherwise would be
denied.129 Authors publishing through these presses seemed to be
121. See id. at 207 (asserting that the sale of pro-suffrage materials at commercial
shops played a crucial role in the “suffragette campaign”).
122. See id.
123. See Laura Furman, “A House Is Not a Home”: Women in Publishing, in
SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS FROM THE WOMEN’S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT 72, 72-75 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) (arguing that publishing houses at
the time were sexist and that women could not advance within the system).
124. See id.
125. See Leigh Felesky, Feminist Ink: Politics and Publishing in a Big Box World,
HERIZONS, Summer 2004, at 46 (noting that the “niche” of “small presses” is to
publish “voices” and views that may otherwise not reach a large audience).
126. See id. at 21 (recognizing some of the Canadian independent publishing
houses—Press Gang, Women’s Press, and Gynergy Press). Felesky also notes that
large presses have recently bought some of these smaller publishing houses, while
others have gone out of business. Id.
127. See id. at 22 (describing volunteer hours as “the backbone of many feminist
presses”).
128. Diane Brown & Maryanne Lynch, Creating a Space: Sybylla Feminist Press,
1988- 2003, 29 HECATE 285, 288 (2003).
129. See Florence Howe, From Race and Class to The Feminist Press, 44 MASS. REV.
117 (2003) (remarking that the “prime purpose of The Feminist Press” was to
“recover and republish” the work of women authors); see also St. Jean, supra note
105, at 397 (arguing that The Feminist Press was responsible for bringing Gilman’s
The Yellow Wallpaper from relative obscurity into prominence as a feminist text). St.
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motivated by the necessity of expressing the ideas of feminism as
much as, if not more than, benefiting from the commercial rewards of
owning copyrights. For example, when Press Gang Publishers, a small
independent feminist publisher, closed its doors, it held a benefit to
help pay the royalties due to its authors who had not been paid in
three years.130 While I am sure these authors would have liked to see
royalty payments, it is also the case that small feminist independent
presses work for reasons other than profits.
Feminist authors often desire their texts to circulate as widely as
possible and to create a critical level of consciousness about feminist
ideas.131 It is possible to argue that early feminists were more
interested in seeing their ideas spread than they were in protecting
their copyrights, an attitude that is not unique to feminists but may
apply to any ideologically motivated group. The explicitly political
origins of Sybylla, organized as a Marxist feminist publishing collective
run primarily by volunteer labor, suggest that providing an alternative
to mainstream publishing that allowed women to publish their ideas
was a crucial aspect of the inception of independent feminist presses
in the 1970s.132 However, equally important to recognize is that while
the demand for royalties may be tempered by the desire to have ideas
published and circulated, the goal of making a living as an author is
not without adherents in feminist circles.133 As feminist ideas become
increasingly main stream and publishers see the market potential in
feminist writing, issues of ownership may begin to transcend sharing
ideas.
Besides providing important avenues for publication by women,
these feminist presses created new conceptual spaces organized upon
different sets of values than those articulated in the mainstream press
and codified as copyright law.134 While royalties and economic
Jean also suggests that the lack of copyright for The Yellow Wallpaper has led to
numerous versions that are not the same, thus creating some room for argument over
how to interpret the text. Id.
130. See Felesky, supra note 125, at 23 (commenting on the necessity of “support
from feminist media” and a “strong feminist readership” in preventing the closing
and, thus, the silencing of feminist presses).
131. See id. at 46 (remarking on the fact that specific smaller, feminist presses have
published works, and thus disseminated ideas, to which the public would not have
had access to otherwise).
132. See Brown & Lynch, supra note 128, at 290 (observing that Sybylla
maintained “a subversive presence in the broad marketplace” by advocating novel
“ways of reading” and noting that this activity was “linked to the socialist-feminist
politics of Sybylla’s past”).
133. See Felesky, supra note 125, at 46 (noting the need for everyone to buy books
so that feminist authors may earn and living and continue to write).
134. See id. (providing an example of one set of values, those held by lesbians, that
mainstream publishers and bookstores do not often recognize).
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survival are not absent from these presses, the focus is much more on
the exchange of ideas, creating an opportunity for political
engagement, and the link to the larger community.135 In other
words, they provide a balance to the simplistic view of property rights
by recognizing the links that exist between author, publisher and
reader. However, not all feminist authors work within this system of
independent presses, and thus their approach to copyright issues
remains to be seen. Whether feminist authors, by the nature of their
feminism, hold a different approach to copyright and their texts is a
question that can only be tested empirically.136
Today, feminist independent presses struggle to survive.137 Because
feminist ideas have, to some degree, become more mainstream, the
market for small feminist presses is shrinking.138 As feminism
entrenched itself in academia, it might also be argued that publishing
within the traditional framework of the original author became
increasingly important for reasons of tenure. Thus, feminist literature
today is produced through the same processes as any other literature
and increasingly subjected to the same calculation—not of quality, but
of sales. Feminist writers want to see their works published through
the “best” presses and reach large audiences. Feminist presses have
had to evolve to remain competitive. Brown and Lynch document
that Sybylla had to change its publishing strategies as feminist theory
moved towards identity politics.139 Despite the many challenges,
feminists dedicated to the ideas expressed through these presses
continue to work to provide an alternative space to the mainstream
publishers.140

135. See id. (noting that one smaller, independent publishing house “is also
dedicated to publishing books on timely feminist issues”).
136. See, e.g., Andrea Abernethy Lunsford, Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of
Ownership, 61 C. ENG. 529, 529-30 (1999) (discussing her own lack of proprietary
feeling towards her writing and noting that many authors have a difficult time with
the concept of “singular authorship”). I, along with the feminist authors Lunsford
mentions in her article, feel less proprietary towards my writing. Other writers
Lunsford has interviewed also attribute their lack of proprietary feelings over their
writing to a feminist system that values collaboration and an acknowledgement of
intellectual debts. Id.
137. See Felesky, supra note 125, at 21 (observing that, at least in Canada, larger
presses have bought several independent feminist presses, and at least one has
closed).
138. See id. at 22 (quoting one employee of the Women’s Press/CSPI as saying,
“[c]learly, the ‘F’ word is not such a bad word as it was when feminist presses opened
their doors thirty years ago”).
139. See Brown & Lynch, supra note 128, at 290 (discussing how politics provoked
changes in Sybylla’s publishing strategies).
140. See Danford, supra note 76, at 18 (observing that feminists are also changing
to meet the new competitive publishing environments, as exemplified by the Feminist
Press, which has reinvented itself through a new feminist pulp fiction series).
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The advantage of a feminist perspective is that it provides a new
lens through which to view copyright. This feminist perspective can
help raise the consciousness of women and men. The issue of
copyright has not been considered a feminist issue, and it is likely that
some process of consciousness-raising is necessary to bring this
approach to a wider audience.141 This paper suggests that a feminist
critique of copyright is possible, even if many contemporary feminists
benefit from the current system.
If one were to create a feminist response to copyright, and by
extension the idea of the romantic author, one might begin by
arguing that the idea of author should be secondary to the circulation
of texts. Lunsford suggests that feminists are beginning to create a
new theory of authorship focused on the connections between
people, not the boundaries separating them.142 A feminist critique
may begin with a critique of how texts are currently assessed—based
upon marketability instead of the quality of the ideas. In fact, while
not specifically a feminist critique, highlighting the centralization of
ownership and authorship into the hands of corporate owners is an
important part of developing an alternative.143 If it were possible for
the works of women to be valued to the same degree as the works of
men, then feminism may debunk the very notion of an individually
creative author and instead locate the text within the reciprocal world
of ideas. Such a position undermines the very concept of copyright
that only conceives of the author as an individual and the work as an
article of private property with clearly defined borders.
A second possible feminist critique might join the postmodern
critique of authorship illustrated by Foucault in his seminal essay,
“What is an Author?”144 Foucault deconstructs what he calls “the
author-function,” the illusion of the author as “authority,” the author
as in control of the text in favor of the circulation of texts without
authors.145 Some feminists recognize the importance of a de141. See Lunsford, supra note 136, at 532 (noting the sheer number of copyrights,
particularly copyrights owned by corporate entities, in recent years).
142. See id. at 538-39 (noting that legal scholar Lani Guinier “situate[s] authority
in the connections a person makes among the discourses available to her and out of
which can come . . . a medley of component voices that is singular and plural at the
same time”).
143. See id. at 532 (pointing out a “‘gold-rush’ mentality” that drives corporate
entities “to copyright and patent everything under the sun”).
144. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed. & Donald
Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977); see also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT
MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” (1993) (discussing Foucault’s link to
“constructivism” and “human agency” and rebutting his critics).
145. See Foucault, supra note 144, at 124-26 (discussing how, with the advent of
stringent property law, the “author-function” became one of “authority” and
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centered author in part because there is no monolithic “self” from
which the “author” works—this line of feminist analysis aligns with the
postmodern move to call for the elimination of the authorfunction.146
Other feminists are less willing to eliminate the concept of the
author because female standpoints and subjectivity (as well as women
authors focusing on class and race) express important aspects of
women’s experience that could not otherwise be articulated.147
These feminist literary critics point to the seeming coincidence
between the increasing importance of women as literary figures and
the claim by male postmodernists that the author is dead.148 Some
feminists find it suspicious that the idea of the author is lost just as
women and people of color are arriving at legitimacy as authors.149
Furthermore, given how easily corporate interests appropriated the
author to cover the centralization of ownership under copyright law,
it is very likely that theories regarding the “death of the author” will
be appropriated into a world where the absence of an author allows
for even greater profits for corporate entities that own copyrights.150
To deal with the clash between the death of the author position and
the need for autonomous feminist agency, a middle ground must be
found.151 Two standards of authorship can help create the balance
between the author-function and authorial agency. First, literary texts
have (rather than are) authors. This idea suggests that the text is not
the sole possession of the author and that texts, once written, are
independent of the author. Second, the fluid nature of subjectivity

propriety).
146. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBDIVISION
OF IDENTITY (1990) (outlining a critique of gendered identity that destabilizes the
notion of the individual as “naturally” gendered by developing the concept of the
heterosexual matrix). Butler does not take up the issue of the author-function. Id.
147. See MOI, supra note 98, at 57-69 (outlining Gilbert and Gubar’s feminist
argument that women’s writing is an expression of women’s experience and placing
their argument in the context of Barthes’ and Foucault’s position that the author is
dead).
148. See Cheryl Walker, Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author, 16 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 551, 560 (1990) (expressing concern that in declaring that the author is
dead, “post-structuralism” is not “meeting the needs of current feminism”).
149. See ELSPETH PROBYN, SEXING THE SELF: GENDERED POSITIONS IN CULTURAL
STUDIES 34 (1993) (developing the argument that many women, especially women of
color, found it problematic that the “death of the author” occurred just as they were
gaining legitimacy in literature).
150. See Lunsford, supra note 136, at 532 (writing that “[m]ore interesting and
alarming to me as a feminist and a rhetorician today, however, is the appropriation of
the sovereign ‘author’ construct by the corporate world”).
151. See Walker, supra note 148, at 560 (contending that “what we need, instead of
a theory of the death of the author, is a new concept of authorship that does not
naively assert that the writer is an originating genius”).
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means that authors can never be fully present in their work.152
Additionally, a postmodern analysis that speaks to the death of the
author is not seeking to eliminate subjectivity but to insert questions
of power into textual analysis.153 The middle path allows for
subjectivity and authorship but gives author limited authority over the
text and its interpretation. Authors should remember that the text
belongs to the reader as well. This critical analysis concludes that
texts may not be the private property of their authors, but at the same
time some authorial autonomy should be retained.154 A path
between private property, where boundaries are established to
prevent the circulation of texts, and pure textual circulation where
the subjectivity of the author is ignored must be considered.
Certainly, copyright law is structured to identify an individual author
and provide certain rights to that author. The law, which at least until
recent additions skewed it towards ownership, provides some “rights”
for readers, but perhaps not as many as it should.
The feminist response recognizes the necessary relationship
between authorship and the public.
In fact, by constructing
authorship within the language of private property (or intellectual
property), as is currently the case, we warp the relationship between
public and private spheres in favor of the private and to the detriment
of the public good.155 Writing, reading, and authorship are all public
acts and as such should only be interpreted within the framework of
the larger public good. A feminist critique of copyright begins by
seeking a true balance between circulation of texts and ownership of
texts.
CONCLUSION—WHERE DOES FEMINISM FIT IN?
I have attempted to investigate the multiple ways feminist
perspectives might be applied to intellectual property. Women who
identify with feminist thought may take any number of positions on
the issue of intellectual property, from endorsing a system that
protects the authorial autonomy of women, or, by contrast, offering a
critique of the underlying assumptions of a property discourse
152. See id. at 566 (interpreting the work of Cora Kaplan as arguing that
“[a]uthors are never full subjective presences because of the fluid nature of
subjectivity”).
153. See id. at 567 (noting that the discussion of the role of the author involves
“politics and power relations”).
154. See id. at 571 (asserting that “[t]hough I may not wish to treat texts as the
private property of their authors, I am unwilling to lose the sense of vital links
between women that only a practice which preserves authors in some form can
provide”).
155. See id. (discussing the link between authoring a piece and owning that piece
as private property).
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founded on a masculine construction of knowledge. While work has
been done on the history of authorship and the ways women were
either ignored and/or used to define the boundaries of literary texts,
much less has been done on the contemporary state of authorship
from a feminist perspective. Additionally, there is a need for a more
direct feminist interpretation of the growing case law on copyright,
patents and trademarks.156
Feminism can provide a study of intellectual property with both a
different viewpoint on the law and a method for articulating a
different process. The alternatives grow from the case examples of
women’s creativity—quilting, knitting and feminist publishing to
name a few. These examples suggest that whether “natural” to
women or not, a different relationship to creative work can be
articulated from a feminist perspective. This is an approach that
recognizes collaboration as much as individual contributions,
recognizes that the author (of a quilt, dress or book) and the
reader/user form an important relationship often based upon mutual
respect, recognition, and care, and that there is no need to construct
a definition of literature or “high art” premised upon reactive
boundaries that declare what good work is not—the work of women.
A feminist perspective works at the foundation of the legal system by
changing the assumptions upon which much of the law is based.
Thus, there would ultimately have to be changes in the law that would
reflect changes in the underlying social structure.
The ultimate threat posed by the system of intellectual property, as
currently conceptualized, is that it may further erode the values that
can still be found in the types of creative endeavors that women
produce. We can hope that by understanding the alternatives a
feminist interpretation makes available, at least some creative people
will be provided with a cultural space where creation is about more
than property rights. Of course, a structural critique must be
tempered by the fact that numerous women have turned the
traditional system of intellectual property to their benefit. In the end,
much as in the beginning, it is difficult to see a single feminist
interpretation applying here.
However, the many different
interpretations create a more complex and richer dialogue on
intellectual property, one that seems important to continue.

156. See generally Bartow, supra note 10 (presenting some interesting work on
trademark case law and suggesting that many trademark cases have been decided
using a gendered lens).
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